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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
AREY V. STATE: IN A DNA POST-CONVICTION 
PROCEEDING, A PROSECUTOR MUST DILIGENTLY 
SEARCH ALL PLACES WHERE THE EVIDENCE COULD 
REASONABLY BE FOUND IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN 
THAT THE EVIDENCE NO LONGER EXISTS. 
By: Joseph Lane 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in a DNA post-
conviction proceeding under section 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure 
Article, a prosecutor must diligently search all places where the 
evidence could reasonably be found in order to ascertain that the 
evidence no longer exists. Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 
(2007). In so holding, the Court clarified that although inmates do not 
have a statutory or constitutional right to either an evidentiary hearing 
or court-appointed counsel, the Court has inherent power to hold such 
hearings and ordinarily should do so in the interest of justice. Id. at 
491,929 A.2d at 501. 
In April, 1974, a jury convicted Douglas Arey ("Arey") of first-
degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of 
violence, sentencing him to life in prison and a concurrent sentence of 
ten-years for the handgun violation. The prosecution's case rested in 
part on blood tests taken from Arey's shirt, which was shown to 
contain the blood types of both Arey (type 0) and the murder victim 
(type AB). Arey argued both blood types were found on his shirt 
because, during his initial police interview, he was picking pimples on 
his face and wiping the blood on his shirt. The blood from his pimples 
mixed with the bacteria from his face, thereby skewing the laboratory 
results and leading to a finding that there was AB type blood on the 
shirt, rather than solely type O. Despite Arey's argument, the jury 
found for the prosecution and convicted Arey. 
On May 7, 2002, while acting pro se from prison, Arey filed a 
petition tothe Circuit Court for Baltimore City under section 8-201 of 
the Criminal Procedure Article requesting that his clothes, which were 
used as evidence in his 1974 case, be retrieved for DNA testing. Arey 
wanted to show that only his blood was on the shirt and that the 
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original laboratory technician had been wrong. On August 8, 2005, 
the circuit court responded to Arey's petition by sending a letter to him 
and the State reporting that an assistant public defender informed the 
court that she was told that the evidence had been destroyed many 
years earlier. The circuit court gave Arey thirty days to provide the 
court with information indicating that the evidence was still in 
existence. In response to this letter, Arey filed a pleading asking the 
circuit court to mandate that the State enter affidavits offering first-
hand knowledge that the State searched for the requested evidence. 
Arey also requested an evidentiary hearing for appointment of counsel 
in the same pleading. The circuit court responded by scheduling a 
hearing, with the caveat that the hearing would be cancelled if the 
State supplied an affidavit of a person with first-hand knowledge 
stating that the State no longer had the evidence. Thereafter, the State 
provided an affidavit from the Sergeant-in-charge of the Evidence 
Control Unit ("ECU") in Baltimore City, stating that he could not 
locate the requested evidence in the ECU database or forms. The 
circuit court cancelled the hearing after the affidavit was filed. Arey 
responded by filing motions to strike the filing of the affidavit and the 
Order which cancelled the hearing, both of which were denied. Under 
section 8-2010)(6), Arey noted a timely appeal directly to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, which was granted. 
The first issue the Court addressed was whether the State failed to 
show that the evidence no longer existed by merely entering an 
affidavit from a police officer who checked the ECU. Arey, 400 Md. 
at 501, 929 A.2d at 507. In deciding this issue, the Court analyzed 
Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006), which held that a 
court should not dismiss a petition for testing before the individual has 
time to respond. Arey, 400 Md. at 501-02, 929 A.2d at 507 (citing 
Blake, 395 Md. at 222, 909 A.2d at 1025). Blake further noted that 
since the State is in possession of the evidence, it has the burden of 
establishing that it no longer exists, and merely stating that it no longer 
exists will not suffice. Arey, 400 Md. at 502, 929 A.2d at 507 (citing 
Blake, 395 Md. at 227, 231, 909 A.2d at 1028, 1031). 
In order to determine what steps the State must take to conclude 
that the evidence in question no longer exists, the Court looked to a 
report ("NIJ Report") published by the National Commission of the 
Future of DNA Evidence, a group created by the National Institute of 
Justice. Arey, 400 Md. at 502, 929 A.2d at 507. The NIJ Report 
recommended that the State look for evidence in the "most likely 
places," including prosecutors' offices, defense investigators' offices, 
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hospitals, evidence rooms, crime laboratories, clerks of courts offices, 
and court reporters. Id. at 502-03, 929 A.2d at 507-08. Additionally, 
the Court required that the State first identify the protocol for storing 
evidence that was in place at the time of the trial in order to help guide 
the search for the evidence. Id. at 503, 929 A.2d at 508. 
Applying these guiding principles to the case at bar, the Court held 
that searching the ECU alone did not suffice. Id. at 503, 929 A.2d at 
507. Rather, the State was required to search any place in which the 
evidence could reasonably have been found. Id. at 503-04, 929 A.2d 
at 508. In addition, the State should have determined the protocol for 
dealing with evidence at the time of Arey's 1974 trial and looked in 
other places for the evidence beyond the ECU. Id. at 504, 929 A.2d at 
508. At the very least, the State should have searched any place 
referred to in the trial testimony as possible storage places for the 
evidence such as labs, court property rooms, and the judge's 
chambers. Id. at 504, 929 A.2d at 508-09. 
The next issue addressed by the Court, although not necessary to 
the disposition of the case, was whether the trial court erred in placing 
the burden on Arey rather than the State to produce evidence that the 
clothes in question still existed. Id. at 504, 929 A.2d at 509. The 
Court noted that in order for the State to satisfy its burden of 
persuasion, it must first set forth either a direct or circumstantial prima 
facie case that the evidence no longer exists. Id. at 505, 929 A.2d at 
509. If the State meets that burden, however, the onus is on the 
petitioner to demonstrate that the evidence does exist. Id. at 505, 929 
A.2d at 509. 
The third issue which the Court addressed was whether principles 
of due process entitled Arey to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 505, 929 
A.2d at 509. The Court decided that while an evidentiary hearing is 
not required under the due process clause of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights, the court should consider the fairness concerns regarding 
wrongful conviction or sentencing which underlie due process, and 
should hold a hearing whf'never the court detennines that there is a 
genuine material issue of fact as to whether the evidence still exists. 
Id. at 507,929 A.2d at 510. 
The development of DNA testing represents one of the most 
significant changes to the criminal legal system in decades. The 
importance of DNA testing cannot be overlooked. As such, Maryland 
criminal practitioners should be well aware of any developments in the 
law which may help in their ability to acquit those falsely accused and 
ensure that prison is a place only for the guilty. 
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Furthermore, this case could not have come at a more relevant time. 
In April of 2007, the United States saw the 200th DNA conviction 
reversal as a result of DNA testing. u.s. sees 200th DNA conviction 
reversal, available at http://www.reuters.com. If one considers the 
number of convictions in the United States each year, it is impossible 
to ignore the fact that at least a small percentage of those convictions 
are erroneous. 
